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The Global SOF Network: Posturing Special Operations Forces
to Ensure Global Security in the 21st Century
Abstract
Globalization’s “interconnecting” effects have blended with an ethos of instability to create
an extraordinarily complex global security environment. Though the number of armed
conflicts worldwide has declined since the early 1990s, the character of those conflicts has
evolved in some troubling ways. Conventional inter-state wars are less common, but they
have been displaced by a proliferation of smaller scale, asymmetric, diffuse and episodic
struggles: What Trinquier calls “subversive warfare or revolutionary warfare.” The
participants in these conflicts are not limited to national military forces, but include a
range of non-state actors, including militias, ethnic groups, illicit transnational networks,
informal paramilitary organizations, and violent extremists. Many of today’s most vexing
global threats, including those that affect the United States’ national security interests,
emanate from terrorist networks, transnational criminal organizations, rogue states, and
the intersection of activities and shared objectives among malicious actors operating from
frontiers or “ungoverned spaces.” Special Operations Forces (SOF) have had an essential,
but evolving, role in countering those threats.
The articles assembled in this issue of Journal of Strategic Security examine SOF’s role in
the global, joint force of the future. Through a military-academic partnership between U.S.
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the University of South Florida, five papers
have been selected for the purpose of further developing dialogue on issues related to
SOF’s pivot toward partnership-driven, indirect action. Some common themes emerge in
these works: a view that future security rests in partnerships, and an acknowledgement
that the threats, constraints, and realities of the current strategic environment demand
applications of “smart power” to assure collective security.
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Introduction
Globalization’s “interconnecting” effects have blended with an ethos of instability
to create an extraordinarily complex global security environment. Though the
number of armed conflicts worldwide has declined since the early 1990s,1 the
character of those conflicts has evolved in some troubling ways. Conventional
inter-state wars are less common, but they have been displaced by a proliferation
of smaller scale, asymmetric, diffuse and episodic struggles: What Trinquier calls
“subversive warfare or revolutionary warfare.”2 The participants in these
conflicts are not limited to national military forces, but include a range of nonstate actors, including militias, ethnic groups, illicit transnational networks,
informal paramilitary organizations, and violent extremists. Many of today’s
most vexing global threats, including those that affect the United States’ national
security interests, emanate from terrorist networks, transnational criminal
organizations, rogue states, and the intersection of activities and shared
objectives among malicious actors operating from frontiers or “ungoverned
spaces.”3 Special Operations Forces (SOF) have had an essential, but evolving,
role in countering those threats.
When Admiral William H. McRaven assumed command of U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 2011, he initiated a rigorous process
assessing how to best position and sustain United States SOF to meet current and
future challenges to U.S. national security. Guiding the assessment was an
assumption that “there are no local problems;”4 solutions, therefore, must come
through cooperating, collaborating, and building capacity with partner nations.
McRaven referred to the product of that assessment as the Global SOF Network
strategy.

The World of Action – Direct and Indirect
Since September 11, 2001, the public has generally pictured SOF as a cadre of
elite warriors maneuvering in the dark of night, breaking down doors and
apprehending terrorists. Those direct action activities are indeed among U.S.
SOF’s specialties, but their role is much broader and includes a range of indirect
operations as well. Every day, in over 75 countries around the world, U.S. SOF
work with partner nations to build the capabilities of indigenous special
operations forces to better confront the threat of violent extremism, terrorism
and other threat networks. In addition to building foreign internal defense, U.S.
SOF regularly deploy throughout the world on humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief missions, providing vital medical services to underserved

1

Hewitt, J., Wilkenfield, J., & T.R. Gurr, T.R., Peace and Conflict (Boulder, CO: Paradigm
Publishers, 2010).
2 Trinquier, Roger, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (Westport, CT: Praeger
Security International, 2006).
3 Clunan, A. and Trinkunas, H., “Conceptualizing Ungoverned Spaces” in Ungoverned Spaces:
Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2010).
4 Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN, Commander, United States Special
Operations Command, Before the 113th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Emerging
Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee.
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populations and aid to communities devastated by natural disasters. These
indirect actions are the backbone of the Global SOF Network.
Working with and through partner forces is the hallmark of SOF’s indirect
approach. Adhering to the support role is critical in these operations. Host
nations must take the lead. Host forces best understand the threats, the local
operating environment, the population; and they can anticipate the secondary
effects of intervention. When U.S. SOF train and build capacity within host
nation forces, they simultaneously enable enduring, adaptive solutions and
enhance the reach and depth of SOF intelligence and operations against shared
problems.
SOF are expanding their indirect missions as they increasingly seek to intervene
earlier in the continuum of military operations. For several years, the U.S.
Department of Defense has used the term “Phase Zero” operations to refer to the
pre-conflict phase of armed struggles. Phase Zero activity is almost always part of
a joint interagency operation, and is most often conducted in partnership with
host nation forces. The operations aim to identify and remediate early indicators
of instability and disorder, and shape the operating environment before
deteriorating conditions make conflict inevitable. These tasks draw on
diplomacy and development assistance, not just on military tactical skill. Phase
Zero operations employ a “strategic diplomacy” for which interagency
partnerships within and across U.S. agencies are as important as connections
between U.S. and host nation forces.
Operational success in countering current threats and preventing future conflict
lies in a whole-of-government approach. SOF represents just one component.
SOF must coordinate and synchronize efforts with interagency partners, both
domestically and with the interagencies of partner nations. The Global SOF
Network strategy strives to pursue a multidimensional, coordinated and deconflicted approach to achieve strategic priorities and maximize resources in
today’s constrained fiscal environment.
As the U.S. military transitions from a protracted war, USSOCOM is re-focusing
its efforts, believing that by remaining engaged with the world and allied partners
in a positive, productive manner, the U.S. can make strides towards deterring
aggression and malicious actors worldwide. The Global SOF Network provides
the U.S. with an agile, flexible presence abroad, founded on partnerships and
mutual trust. It allows for U.S. presence to be networked and globally
coordinated, as are the adversaries that pose a threat to U.S. national security
and interests.
The ongoing drawdown of troops in Afghanistan makes available more U.S. SOF
to pursue indirect operations designed to increase security and prevent areas of
instability from deteriorating into large-scale contingencies. This is being done
through a strategy of engagement, not attrition. Working with allies empowers
them to confront and combat the threats originating within their own borders,
preventing local issues from escalating into global problems.
SOF’s pivot to indirect operations requires a concomitant shift in resources and a
new program of professional education to prepare the next generation of SOF
2
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss2/2
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.7.2.1

Yoho et al.: The Global SOF Network

leaders. President Obama, recognizing the importance of global partnerships and
indirect operations, called on Congress in May 2014 to support a new
counterterrorism partnership fund to “allow us to train, build capacity and
facilitate partner countries on the front lines.”5
While U.S. SOF operators are the most skilled in the world at hostage rescue and
kill and capture missions, these direct action missions by themselves have a
limited ability to create a safer, more stable world and protect U.S. interests at
home and abroad. The future of SOF, in accordance with Presidential direction
and as envisioned in the Global SOF Network initiative, lies in joint operations,
with U.S. SOF operating by, with, and through its interagency and international
partners.

Persistent Engagement and Building Trust
USSOCOM’s success in leveraging worldwide partnerships to create a global
network requires a foundation of mutual trust. Ensuring returns on those
partnership investments requires enduring engagement. An oft-repeated adage
at USSOCOM is: “You can’t surge trust.” Trust, by definition, requires a
willingness to accept vulnerability or risk based on confident expectations
regarding another’s behavior. Being regarded as trustworthy is a distinction that
must be earned. Research on trustworthiness consistently identifies three major
predictors: ability (perceptions of a trustee’s competence and consistency),
benevolence (perceptions of the trustee’s caring, goodwill, empathy, and
commitment to shared goals), and integrity (perceptions of the trustee’s
objectivity, fairness, honesty, and dedication)6. From that perspective, the deck
appears stacked in favor of U.S. SOF as a highly skilled, reliable cadre of
operators, collaborating with partners to prevent and solve shared problems. But
trust still must be built. Partnership investments, whether though foreign
internal defense or development support, should be made early and persistently,
allowing for personal relationships to deepen and mature through recurrent
cooperative efforts. U.S. SOF can network and coordinate with partner forces to
maintain an agile and flexible global presence, accomplishing more with less.
A positive, forward step for the Global SOF Network came in February 2013,
when USSOCOM was granted authority over the Theater Special Operations
Commands, effectively streamlining the command relationship between the
strategic headquarters and the SOF deployed in theater. This change gave
USSOCOM greater responsibility for resourcing and organizing U.S. SOF
worldwide, but not greater authority to deploy and direct them. Operational
command and control over deployed SOF remains the sole purview of the
Geographic Combatant Commanders.
The Global SOF Network, in essence, is a strategy to reorganize U.S. SOF
worldwide and refocus on training, partnership, and collaborative missions. The
Global SOF Network vision aligns U.S. SOF regionally, promotes persistent

5 “Transcript of President Obama’s Commencement Address at West Point,” New York Times, May
28, 2014, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/us/politics/transcript-of-presidentobamas-commencement-address-at-west-point.html?_r=0.
6 Borum, Randy, The Science Of Interpersonal Trust (McLean, VA: The MITRE Corporation, 2010).
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partnerships, and where logical, supports forward basing. A key component of
the strategy involves integrating foreign partners into the network. To that end,
Admiral McRaven has integrated international SOF Liaison Officers at
USSOCOM headquarters to facilitate communication and information sharing
between U.S. SOF and their partners, and strengthen partnerships through
engagements and training opportunities. After the recent 13 years of combat in
coalition environments, U.S. SOF have reached unprecedented levels of
interoperability and coordination with in-theater partners. Headquarters-based
liaison officers bring this tactical and operational interoperability to the strategic
level, maintaining the progress achieved through tactical/battlefield partnerships
and furthering the ability to communicate, de-conflict, and coordinate across the
Global SOF Network.

Prevention: The New Containment?
In 1946, George Kennan wrote an 8,000 word telegram to Secretary of State
James Byrnes in response to a U.S. Treasury Department query about why the
Soviet Union was not supporting the newly created International Monetary Fund
and World Bank. Kennan’s message, now referred to as the “long telegram,”
outlined a policy of “containment”—preventing or containing the spread of
communism—that would become the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward the Soviet
Union for the next 45 years. Kennan concluded that Soviet strategy was
“impervious to logic of reason” but “highly sensitive to logic of force,” so they
typically would withdraw when they encountered significant resistance. The idea
was that by shaping the Soviet Union’s surrounding environment through
development initiatives and multi-lateral alignments such as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), the U.S. could create a virtual wall around the Soviet
Union that would thwart and deter its expansion. Today, the threat is not so
monolithic, nor is it emanating solely from state actors, yet the logic of
containment, in some form, resonates. That which is to be “contained” is not so
much a state whose socio-political ideology is antithetical to our own, but a set of
warlord-led, feudalistic movements operating in ungoverned spaces and driven
by an anti-Enlightenment mindset.
Plan Colombia, for example, a U.S. foreign aid program, may be seen as a form of
containment whereby the U.S. provided both economic and military assistance
aimed at suppressing violence, corrosive effects of corruption attending the illicit
narcotics trade, and a roiling insurgency that threatened the country’s stability.
On the whole, Plan Colombia has been successful in reducing the narcotics trade
and facilitating peace talks, effectively quelling the diffuse proliferation of
criminal violence that threatened the future of the Colombian state. The Global
SOF Network relies on similar indirect approaches by engaging with host nation
partners and targeting precursors to massive instability and inter-group conflict.
These operations are designed not only to contain clusters of disruption and
disorder, but also to prevent them from threatening state sovereignty and
escalating into large scale wars.

Contributions of the Special Issue
The articles assembled in this issue of Journal of Strategic Security examine
SOF’s role in the global, joint force of the future. Through a military-academic
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partnership between U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the
University of South Florida, five papers have been selected for the purpose of
further developing dialogue on issues related to SOF’s pivot toward partnershipdriven, indirect action. Some common themes emerge in these works: a view
that future security rests in partnerships, and an acknowledgement that the
threats, constraints, and realities of the current strategic environment demand
applications of “smart power” to assure collective security.
One critical issue in future force planning is improving coordination and
relationships among institutions that constitute the security interagency.
Christopher Lamb highlights the imperative of multilateral and interagency
collaboration to effectively navigate the current threat environment with not only
a direct, but also a very robust indirect approach. Successful indirect operations
require a high degree of interagency collaboration. Identifying the key
mechanisms and operating characteristics that support those connections is
critical. Lamb points to the success of the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)South as one potential exemplar of interagency success. The JIATF-South began
in 1994 to support counter-narcotics operations in South America. Key operating
characteristics contributing to JIATF-South’s continued success were replicated
by General (ret.) Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan, as well as in other task
forces. Lamb draws upon the interagency lessons McChrystal outlines in his
autobiography,7 which highlight the importance of 1) collaboration at all levels, 2)
reorganization of the sponsoring organization (such as SOF) to accommodate
collaboration and sharing, 3) end-to-end mission planning that focuses on the
seams of interagency coordination to ensure follow-through and completion of
tasks and operations, and 4) delegation of authority to the lowest levels of the
organization (what is referred to frequently as “mission command”).
In his contribution, Paul Rexton Kan investigates the nexus between narcotics
and other drivers of instability and conflict, and details an approach for SOF to
integrate counter-drug operations with actions against other national security
threats. Kan notes that illicit drug trafficking produces approximately $600
billion in profit annually and accounts for 7.5% of annual global trade. He
highlights the vexing connections that exist between groups involved in drug
trafficking, and those propagating violent extremism as a means to achieve
political, ideological or religious goals. The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Movement
for Unity and Jihad (MUJAO) as well as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
in West Africa have all used proceeds from the drug trade to purchase arms, pay
for expertise that increases their operational effectiveness, and attract recruits
with promises of prosperity. Kan argues that counternarcotics operations are not
an end itself, but a means to countering violent extremism by cutting off vital
financial support.
Emily Spencer demonstrates that cultural intelligence or cross-cultural
competence of special operations forces is a necessary condition for success in
pre-conflict, partnership-building activities. Spencer defines cultural
intelligence, or cross cultural competence, as “the ability to recognize the shared
beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviors of a group of people and, most
7
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importantly, to apply this knowledge toward a specific goal.” Spencer argues that
the concept of cultural intelligence is not new, but to be effective in military
applications, it must be understood and employed “in the context of the national,
international, host nation, and enemy domains.”
Whitney Grespin notes that while U.S. SOF are, and should always remain, the
world’s most capable direction action force, they are also adept and trained in
partner-nation capacity building. Grespin argues that “[a]n investment in
partner nation capacity building now is a down payment against terrorist attacks
and costly ground engagements in the future.” Furthermore, building partner
capacity expands America’s options for protecting its own national security
interests. Grespin points out that in Iraq and Afghanistan SOF worked
predominantly in direct action, at the expense of security assistance and capacitybuilding activities. During these conflicts, responsibility for indirect action such
as village stability operations (VSO), was given to general purpose forces. This
represents “a fundamental shift in responsibility for the conventional forces, as
SOF forces have historically specialized in enabling partner nation foreign
military capacity through the teaching of technical fighting and military
administration skills while mitigating destabilizing drivers of conflict.” Grespin
warns that it is important for the U.S. to preserve SOF’s capacity-building
capability as they are uniquely skilled to carry out such missions at a relatively
low-cost and with a small operational footprint. Comprising just 1.7% of the total
U.S. defense budget, SOF provides a significant return on the defense and
preventive security investment.
In a reprint of his article that first appeared in Prism (the journal of the Center
for Complex Operations at National Defense University), Scott Morrison
describes a need to recalibrate the operational concepts of direct and indirect
approach “from a broader strategic vantage point.” Morrison points out that the
direct and indirect approaches are not separate, compartmentalized tactics but
are part of a continuous, strategic move, arc or campaign. Citing Sir Basil Liddell
Hart’s insights on the power of the indirect approach in strategy, Morrison states
that SOF power may be used as an “economy of force instrument to upset an
adversary’s equilibrium and balance through proactive and preventative
insertion, presence, and action in coordination with a multinational collaborative
network of SOF networks.” Morrison invokes John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s
conclusion that in the future security environment “it will likely take networks to
fight networks, much as, in an earlier era, it took tanks to fight tanks.”8
A Global SOF Network represents the cornerstone of a new, prevention-oriented
security posture. As special operations forces around the world collaborate in
prosecuting complex problems, a new synergy emerges that is stronger than the
sum of its parts. Through persistent support and engagement, U.S. SOF can
continue to build trust among their international partners. They can not only
train host national forces, but also empower them, to better defend their interests
and secure their local spaces. They are able to not only share skills and tactics,
but also the ability to analyze and solve security problems. Navigating and
adapting in unfamiliar environments; engaging, partnering and building trust;

8
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and problem solving amidst uncertainty will be core competencies for a globally
networked SOF postured to combat the threats of today, and of the future.

Keenan Yoho
Tess deBlanc-Knowles
Randy Borum
Guest Co-Editors, Special Issue on The Global SOF Network
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